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THE INCIDENCE AND EFFECTS
OF THE CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFIT TAX
STEPHEN L. MCDONALD*
The crude oil windfall profit tax,' effective February 29, 1980, is
officially described as "a temporary excise, or severance, tax applying
to taxable crude oil produced in the United States.... "2 From this
description some may infer that the burden of the tax will be borne
by domestic consumers of oil in the form of higher prices, with the
usual effect-small in this instance, due to an inelastic demand-of
reduced domestic production. It is the purpose of this article to show
that such an inference is unjustified. In fact, the domestic demand
for domestically produced oil is perfectly elastic at the world price
determined by OPEC, a price which, in our judgment, is unlikely to
be significantly affected by the tax. If this judgment is correct, the
burden of the tax will be borne entirely by oil operators and land-
owners, with the landowners' share increasing as time passes. Further-
more, the effect on domestic output will be substantial, due to the
perfectly elastic effective demand. Domestic oil price deregulation,
which is supposed to be completed by October 1, 1981, is resulting
in a sudden and large rise in price to the world level. It should be
remembered in what follows that this increase was the occasion for
the windfall profits tax.
THE NATURE OF THE TAX
For purposes of the tax, oil production in the United States is
classified into three "tiers."' For oil in tier one, the tax is 70 percent
of the windfall profit.4 The windfall profit is the difference between
the actual selling price of the oil and its May 1979 regulated price
($13.02 per barrel) less $0.21, adjusted for inflation.5 Generally, tier
one oil is oil discovered prior to 1979, including that produced from
the Sadlerochit reservoir on the Alaskan North Slope. However, ex-
cluded from tier one is (1) oil from stripper well properties,6 (2) oil
*Professor of Economics, University of Texas, Austin.
1. Pub. L No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § § 4986-4998).
2. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, SUMMARY OF H.R. 3919, 96th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 6 (1980).
3. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4987(b) (1980).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 4989(c).
6. A stripper well is a well incapable of producing more than ten barrels of oil per day.
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in which the United States has an economic interest and which is
produced from a National Petroleum Reserve,'7 (3) most oil deregu-
lated as front-end financing for tertiary recovery projects, (4) newly
discovered oil, (5) certain heavy oil, and (6) incremental tertiary oil.
These categories are taxed as tier two or tier three oil.8
The tier two tax is 60 percent of the windfall profit, the latter
being the difference between the actual selling price of the oil and
$15.20, adjusted for inflation and for differences in quality and loca-
tion.9 Oil in tier two includes production from stripper well proper-
ties and oil produced from a National Petroleum Reserve in which
the United States has an economic interest.' * Oil produced north of
the Arctic Circle, other than that from the Sadlerochit reservoir, is
exempt from the tax, as is any oil produced from a well located north
of the Alaskan-Aleutian mountain range and more than 75 miles from
the Alaska pipeline.' 1 Certain tertiary oil freed from regulation for
purposes of front-end financing is exempt from the tax until Septem-
ber 30, 1981.12
Tier three oil is subject to a 30 percent tax on the difference be-
tween the actual selling price of the oil and $16.55, adjusted for in-
flation plus two percent and for differences in quality and location. 3
This oil consists of (1) newly discovered oil, (2) certain heavy oil,
and (3) incremental tertiary oil.' 4 Newly discovered oil is oil from
(1) an outer continental shelf area for which the lease was entered
into on or after January 1, 1979, or (2) an onshore property from
which no oil was produced in calendar year 1978. Heavy oil is de-
fined as oil with an API specific gravity of 16 degrees or less.1 ' Incre-
mental tertiary oil is tertiary production in excess of a base level.1 6
The base level is average daily production of the property in question
for the six-month period ending March 31, 1979, reduced by the sum
of one percent for each post-1978 month up to the project beginning
date and 21/2 percent for each month thereafter.' 7
Independent producers are allowed reduced tax rates on so much
of their combined production of tier one and tier two oil as does not
7. A National Petroleum Reserve is a deposit of oil designated by the federal government
as a reserve for use only in specified emergencies (e.g., war).
8. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4991(a)-(e) (1980).
9. Id. § § 4987(b), 4989(d).
10. Id. § 4991(d).
11. Id. § 4994(e).
12. Id. § 4994(c).
13. Id. § § 4987(b), 4989(d).
14. Id. § 4991(e).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 4993(a).
17. Id. § 4993(b).
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exceed 1,000 barrels per day.' 8 For them the tier one rate on this oil
is 50 percent, and the tier two rate is 30 percent.' 9
The windfall profit tax applies to increased income from royalty
interests as well as operating interests. However, exempt from the tax
is an oil interest held on January 21, 1980, by or for the benefit of
an Indian, an Indian tribe, or an Indian tribal organization meeting
certain qualifying requirements.2 Also exempt is oil production
owned by state and local governments if the proceeds are used for a
public purpose.2 1 Finally, oil produced from properties owned by
charitable medical facilities and educational institutions, or dedicated
to them by churches, is exempt from the tax if the properties were
owned by the charity on January 21, 1980.22
For taxpayers generally, the windfall profit subject to tax is limited
to 90 percent of the net income from a property.2" The windfall
profit tax is a deductible business expense for purposes of ordinary
income taxation. 24  For purposes of computing percentage deple-
tion,2  where it still applies, gross income from the property is not
reduced by the windfall profit tax. 2 6 The tax is reduced by the
amount of state severance taxes on the windfall profit. Increases in
state severance tax rates after March 31, 1979, are taken into account
only if the increases apply equally to the entire price of the barrel of
oil, and only to the extent that the total rate of severance tax im-
posed by the state does not exceed 15 percent. 2 7 As earlier noted,
base prices are to be adjusted periodically for inflation; the GNP de-
flator is the measure of inflation used for this adjustment. 2 8
In general, then, the crude oil windfall profit tax is a percentage of
the difference between the actual selling price of oil and certain base
prices derived loosely from regulatory experience. The tax gets its
name from the implicit assumption that increases in price above the
base levels confer windfall profits on oil operators and landowners,
profits that can be taxed away without materially reducing incentives
to produce.
Before commencing analysis regarding incidence and effects, con-
18. Id. § 4992(c).
19. IM § 4987(b).
20. Id. § 4994(d).
21. Id. § 4994(a).
22. Id. § 4994(b).
23. Id. § 4988(b).
24. Id.
25. Percentage depletion is a special deduction for tax purposes, now allowed only for
small independent oil producers, equal to a percentage of gross income.
26. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 4988(a) (1980).
27. Id. § 4996(c).
28. Id. § 4989(b).
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sider the determination of oil prices in the United States in the ab-
sence of regulation.
OIL PRICE DETERMINATION AFTER DEREGULATION
For purposes of this discussion, we shall abstract from differences
among old regulated prices of oil and speak of "the" regulated price.
Similarly, we shall abstract from differences among prices charged by
exporting countries, chiefly members of OPEC, and speak of "the"
world price.
Figure I shows the price situation prior to deregulation. DD is the
demand curve for the United States. S1 S, is the long run domestic
supply curve (long run marginal costs) exclusive of royalty. The
dashed curve BASI +R is the long run supply curve plus royalty, the
latter assumed to be a fixed fraction-say, 1/8 of the regulated price
OPr
. 
The domestic industry is assumed to be in long run equilibrium
with ouput at OQ1 , where long run marginal costs plus royalty are
equal to the regulated price.
Imports occur at the world price, OPw, of course. The two prices
are effectively reduced to one by means of the "entitlements" system.
Refiners are issued rights to run2 9 domestic oil proportionate to
their total runs, but limited in sum to domestic output. Importing re-
finers find themselves with a surplus of rights, while refiners with ac-
cess to domestic oil have an equal deficit. Importing refiners sell their
rights to domestic oil refiners for an amount equal to the difference
between the regulated and the world prices. The result is that all re-
finers pay the same net price for the oil they run, here assumed to be
OPa, whether they run domestic oil exclusively or imported oil ex-
clusively, and their competitive relations are undisturbed. At the
average effective price of OPa the total quantity demanded is OQ2
and imports are Q1 Q2.
It is useful to note in passing that in achieving long run equilibrium
operators tend to pay landowners the triangular area ABC in the form
of lease bonuses, so that total rent paid is the four-sided area ADEC.
Now suppose that domestic prices are suddenly and unexpectedly
deregulated. Figure II depicts the situation. The demand and supply
curves are as before, except that we have added a short run supply
curve (short run marginal costs) that is anchored to the previous rate
of output and is a great deal less elastic than the long run curve. De-
regulation causes prices to rise to the world level and they cannot
29. Rights to run are legal entitlements under current price regulation, evidenced by a
certificate, to run domestic oil in refineries. "Run" is used in the industry as both a verb and
a noun and refers to the input of crude oil in the refinery process.
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FIGURE I
PRICES AND OUTPUT IN THE UNITED STATES WITH
PRICE REGULATION
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FIGURE II
PRICE AND OUTPUT IN THE UNITED STATES WITH
PRICE DEREGULATION
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thereafter significantly differ from it, since imports are perfect sub-
stitutes for domestic oil. The absolute size of the royalty, now based
on the higher world price, is greater than before. In short run equilib-
rium domestic output is OQ 1 , hardly different from that under regu-
lated prices. Since the rise in price was unexpected, operator profits
are increased by the area ABCD. This is a classic "windfall" that is
shared by royalty interests, since the royalty rises in proportion to
the rise in price.
In the long run, however, as the industry expanded its exploration
effort, domestic output would rise to OQ 2 , where long run marginal
costs plus royalty are equal to the world price, and imports would
fall from Q1 Q3 to Q2 Q3. In the process of achieving the long run
equilibrium operators would tend to pay out to landowners the tri-
angular area DFE in the form of lease bonuses. Total rent would be
the four-sided area FGHD. Thus in the long run the "windfall" would
accrue to landowners in the form of lease bonuses and increased
royalty.
THE INCIDENCE AND MAJOR EFFECT OF THE TAX
We can now more clearly see how the burden of the tax is borne in
the short and long runs. The situation is depicted in Figure III. For
purposes of this figure it is assumed that the tax rate is uniform; its
incidence is independent of the fact that the rate varies from tier to
tier. To avoid unnecessary clutter, we have omitted the short run
supply curve. The demand and long run supply curves are as before.
The long run supply plus royalty curve is shown (BAHS +R), and
also shown is that curve reduced by the tax on the royalty (CDS1 +R-
T). The curve FE is the long run supply curve plus royalty plus wind-
fall tax paid nominally by operators. The domestic price remains at
the world level, since the effective domestic demand for domestic oil
is perfectly elastic along GEHJ due to the perfect substitutability of
imports for domestic production. Long run equilibrium is at point E,
with domestic output equal to 0Qj. The tax paid nominally by oper-
ators is ABFE, and that paid by landowners is ADCB.
As the discussion of Figure II indicated, in the short run it is the
royalty and operator profits that are increased by price deregulation.
Since with the tax the price is no higher than without it, the short
run burden of the tax falls on landowners and operators in proportion
to their respective gains. In the long run, however, operators would
have tended to pay lease bonuses to landowners in the amount of
GHB without the tax; with the tax they will tend to pay only GEF.
The reduction in payments to landowners is the lease bonuses lost al-
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FIGURE III
PRICE AND OUTPUT IN THE UNITED STATES WITH
DEREGULATION AND TAX
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together (AEH), plus the tax paid nominally by operators (ABFE).
Consequently, the long run burden of the tax is borne almost entirely
by landowners, with operators suffering some loss in total profits due
to the reduced scale of domestic output (from OQ2 to OQ, ).
This conclusion is qualified somewhat by the fact that the tax will
terminate after 10-14 years, depending on when a target sum has
been raised.3 o The life of most oil properties, through stripper status
and possibly secondary and tertiary recovery, is much longer. During
the period of the tax there will not be time for operators to turn over
the complete initial stock of producing properties and compete away
excess profits in the form of lease bonuses. Thus in the intermediate
run operator profits will remain abnormally high on many properties;
and since the tax reduces these profits, its burden is to that extent
borne by operators. We conclude therefore that the burden of the tax
is on operators and landowners, with the burden on the latter increas-
ing as time passes.
It may be observed that if in the absence of the tax deregulation in
the United States would have lowered the world price, due to in-
30. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4990(c)-(d) (1980).
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creased United States output in the long run, the world price is in
effect raised by the tax, so that the burden of the tax is borne to
some extent by worldwide consumers. As earlier suggested, our judg-
ment is that the world price would be unaffected by simple deregula-
tion in the United States. In the first place, any increase in United
States output without the tax would be small relative to world supply,
and the increase would occur slowly over a long period of time. There-
fore, in the second place, increased United states output would not
be likely to be a substantial consideration among the many political
and economic considerations affecting the price deliberations of a
less than monolithic OPEC cartel. In any case, we have no evidence
that OPEC is a systematic profit maximizer that would alter both out-
put and price in response to an "outside" change in supply. Our judg-
ment is that any significant increase in United States output would
be met by reduced output by the dominant world supplier in the car-
tel, Saudi Arabia. If we err in this judgment, then worldwide con-
sumers share the burden of the tax with United States landowners.
As Figure III shows, the principal effect of the tax is to reduce do-
mestic oil output below what it would have been with simple price
deregulation. With simple deregulation, domestic output would have
been OQ 2 , and imports Q2 Q3. With deregulation and the windfall
profit tax, domestic output is OQ1 and imports Q1 Q3 . This is, of
course, a perverse effect in the light of the supposed national policy
of reducing dependence on foreign oil.
SOME SUBSIDIARY EFFECTS
Since the tax is not uniform, the domestic production of different
classes of oil will be discouraged differentially. Least discouraged will
be oil exempt from the tax (certain oil produced in north Alaska) and
oil subject to the lowest tax rate of 30 percent (newly discovered oil,
certain heavy oil, and incremental tertiary oil). Most discouraged will
be oil subject to the highest rate of 70 percent, generally oil discov-
ered prior to 1979 except for stripper and National Reserve oil sub-
ject to the 60 percent rate. These differential rates mean some distor-
tion of resource allocation within the domestic industry and thus
some loss of general economic efficiency. It is, of course, at the mar-
gins that different classes of oil will be differentially affected in the
longer run, since economic rents bear the main part of the burden.
There will also be some distortion as between small independents
and major producing companies. The former are accorded lower tax
rates on the first 1,000 barrels per day of production, and this effect
is magnified by the allowance of percentage depletion, still available
[Vol. 21
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to small independents, on the price gross of windfall profit. Indepen-
dents will probably displace "majors" in many barely supramarginal
oil operations.
Finally, as earlier noted, windfall profits subject to tax are reduced
by state severance taxes on the windfall so long as the state severance
tax rate does not exceed 15 percent. This is an invitation for the
states to raise their severance tax rates to this maximum level, for by
doing so they increase their revenues largely at the expense of the
United States treasury,3 without raising prices to consumers. One
may predict that the producing states will respond positively to this
invitation.
CONCLUSION
We believe the incidence of the oil windfall profit tax falls on op-
erators and landownwers, with the latter bearing an increasing burden
as time passes and operators turn over the initial stock of producing
properties. The tax results in reduced domestic output and increased
imports, relative to a situation of simple deregulation of prices. Other
effects are some distortion in the allocation of resources within the
domestic industry and a tax windfall for state governments at the ex-
pense of the United States treasury.
31. Operators and landowners would have to pay the additional severance tax on the
base price, but not on the windfall.
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